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EDWARD SNOWDEN: HERO OR TRAITOR?  
CONSIDERING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY 
AND WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 
Mark Friedman* 
ABSTRACT 
Edward Snowden’s disclosures of secret National Security Agency documents 
have significant implications for Canadian national security law. Snowden’s 
revelation that the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) 
attempted to spy on the Brazilian government is analyzed to determine: first, 
whether economic intelligence gathering is a legal function of CSEC; and, 
second, whether CSEC employees would be afforded protection by the Security 
of Information Act (SOIA) if they decided to reveal the existence of such a 
program. Since whistleblower protection for intelligence agency personnel has 
never been tested in Canadian courts, the author draws on different areas of 
law to fill a void in Canadian legal literature and jurisprudence. In this respect, 
Snowden’s case allows observers to imagine how whistleblower protection 
might operate and, in doing so, provides a case study to determine whether 
SOIA’s provisions are overly restrictive or lenient. Ultimately, the author 
suggests that CSEC’s statutory framework permits the organization to spy on 
a foreign government for economic intelligence. Furthermore, whistleblower 
protection law would not protect Snowden because the manner in which he 
disclosed secret information does not comply with the framework set out 
in the SOIA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hero. Traitor. Whistleblower. Leaker. “Grandiose narcissist who deserves 
to be in prison.”1 In what has been described as the “the most serious 
compromise of classified information in the history of the US intelligence 
community,”2 Edward Snowden’s disclosure of National Security Agency (NSA) 
intelligence documents has unlocked wider debates concerning the perceived 
surrender of privacy rights for national security interests. The impact of these 
leaks is not limited to the United States (US). The story is of particular interest 
for Canada because among the documents that Snowden uncovered was a 
slideshow that revealed the Communications Security Establishment Canada 
(CSEC) had engaged in economic espionage against Brazil’s Ministry of Mines 
and Energy. This was the first of several Snowden leaks concerning CSEC activity 
and raises important questions regarding the utility and legality of spying on 
countries with which Canada enjoys amicable economic and diplomatic ties. 
The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to consider the legality of the 
espionage program; and second, to examine whether Snowden’s decision to 
expose the program would have been legal if he were an employee of the 
Canadian government and subject to Canadian secrecy laws. Is Snowden a hero 
for making Canadians aware of CSEC’s activities, and would a Canadian court 
reach the same conclusion? This is the focus of the hypothetical case study.  
In Part I, the article will outline the legislative parameters guiding CSEC, a 
close-knit agency of approximately 2,100 employees with a rising annual budget 
that stood at over $460.9 million when the slideshow was leaked in 2013.3 Next, 
the legality of CSEC’s alleged operations in gathering economic intelligence in 
Brazil will be examined; the outcome of this analysis will directly affect a 
                                                                                                                                            
1  Jeffrey Toobin, “Edward Snowden is No Hero”, The New Yorker (10 June 2013), online: 
<www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/edward-snowden-is-no-hero>. 
2  “Edward Snowden’s leaks most serious in US history: ex-CIA official”, NDTV (26 October 2013), online: 
<www.ndtv.com/world-news/edward-snowdens-leaks-most-serious-in-us-history-ex-cia-official-538988>. 
3  This is over 4.5 times larger than CSEC’s budget in 1999. The fact that the government has earmarked 
over $1.2 billion to construct a new building for the agency also underscores the expanding role and 
prioritization of the agency within Canada’s wider security apparatus. See Colin Freeze, “How CSEC 
became an electronic spying giant”, The Globe and Mail (30 November 2013), online: <www.theglobeand 
mail.com/news/politics/how-csec-became-an-electronic-spying-giant/article15699694> [Freeze, “How 
CSEC became”].  
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determination of whether Snowden’s disclosure of the program was itself legal. 
In Part II, the article will briefly discuss the history of unauthorized disclosures 
in the US, and how this history informs the extensive use of the Espionage Act to 
clamp down on ‘leakers’ today. This situation will be contrasted with Canada’s 
experience under the Security of Information Act. In Part III, the paper will discuss 
Canadian laws that govern whistleblower protection for civil servants in the 
intelligence community and compare those laws with American legislation. Lastly, 
it will put Snowden on trial; if Snowden were charged for publicly releasing secret 
information about Brazil, would he have a workable defence under Canada’s 
whistleblower protection laws?  
In undertaking this analysis, this article suggests that CSEC’s broad mandate 
to collect foreign intelligence includes the gathering of economic intelligence 
from foreign ministries. With regard to whistleblower protection, the paper 
determines that Snowden would not have a defence in Canada to justify his public 
disclosures, despite the greater protection afforded to whistleblowers in Canada 
than in the US.  
I. CSEC AND THE LEGALITY OF ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE 
On October 6, 2013, the Brazilian television network Globo extracted a 
CSEC-created slideshow from the trove of Snowden’s information treasury.4 The 
slideshow, a June 2012 CSEC presentation before the NSA, discussed the 
former’s plans to spy on the Brazilian Ministry of Mines and Energy through a 
program called Olympia. The content of the slideshow suggests that CSEC 
sought to monitor Brazilian e-mail and telecommunications in order to gather 
economic intelligence. The plan and its publication in the media placed the 
discreet organization front and centre in international headlines.  
CSEC’s ex-chief, John Forster, defended the organization, saying 
“everything that CSEC does in terms of foreign intelligence follows Canadian 
                                                                                                                                            
4  “Canadian spies targeted Brazil’s mines ministry: report”, CBC News (7 October 2013), online: Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation <www.cbc.ca/news/canadian-spies-targeted-brazil-s-mines-ministry-report-
1.1927975>. 
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law.”5 However, that did not stop the organization from being criticized in public 
media. The slideshow suggested that CSEC had become unruly and unconcerned 
with the diplomatic consequences of or legal constraints on its actions.6 A 
particularly concerning aspect of CSEC’s spying was that the information it 
gathered from Brazil could be forwarded to Canadian corporations seeking to 
weigh the viability of investment opportunities. Effectively, the Canadian 
government proposed to spy on behalf of private interests instead of working 
exclusively for the 1,000 government departments and agencies for which CSEC 
provides information.7 
Collecting economic intelligence is not new to CSEC. For instance, CSEC 
spied on envoys from Mexico and Uruguay during respective multilateral trade 
negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s.8 The difference now is that the National 
Defence Act (NDA)9 restrains CSEC’s activities. As University of Ottawa Professor 
Craig Forcese notes, CSEC must act in accordance with its mandate when 
intercepting foreign intelligence. Thus, the only way CSEC’s economic 
intelligence gathering could be lawful is if its actions fit within the organization’s 
statutory mandate.10 
Under section 273.64 of the NDA, CSEC is responsible for acquiring and 
using information derived from the “global information infrastructure for the 
purpose of providing foreign intelligence, in accordance with Government of 
Canada intelligence priorities.” While the mandate is broad, the NDA’s definition 
of key terms narrows the scope of CSEC’s legal parameters. Under section 
273.62, foreign intelligence is defined as “information or intelligence about the 
capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or 
                                                                                                                                            
5  “More Intelligence, Please, About Intelligence”, The Globe and Mail (14 October 2013), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/editorials/more-intelligence-please-about-intelligence/ 
article14847584> [“More Intelligence”].  
6  Ibid.  
7  Freeze, “How CSEC became”, supra note 3. 
8  Martin Rudner, “Canada’s Communications Security Establishment: from Cold War to Globalisation” 
Occasional Paper No 22 (Carleton University: Norman Patterson School of International Affairs, 2000) at 
28. 
9  National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 273.66 [NDA]. 
10  Since the foreign intelligence collected from Brazil did not have a Canadian nexus, there are no other 
statutory rules that would circumscribe CSEC’s activity. Ministerial authorization is only required for 
interceptions that involve a Canadian or a person in Canada. See Craig Forcese, National Security Law: 
Canadian Practice in International Perspective (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 455; NDA, supra note 9, s 273.65. 
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terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” 
Therefore, unless there is a clear nexus between the intelligence gathered and 
international affairs, defence, or security, CSEC is not authorized to gather it. 
While the NDA does not provide definitions of international affairs, 
national security, or national defence, an overview of court decisions in other 
areas of law may be useful to determine their scope. In Canada (Attorney General) 
v Almalki, a 2010 decision of the Federal Court, Justice Mosley reviewed the 
government’s ability to withhold information under the Canada Evidence Act for 
the sake of “national security, national defence, or international relations.”11 The 
Court found that national defence should be defined as “all measures taken by a 
nation to protect itself against its enemies.” Meanwhile, Mosley J. interpreted 
national security as “the preservation of the Canadian way of life including the 
safeguarding of the security of persons, institutions and freedoms in Canada.”12  
The Canadian government would not be able to substantiate the Olympia 
operation on defence or security grounds if these definitions were applied to 
CSEC’s mandate. For one, CSEC could not ground Olympia as a defence matter 
because Brazil is a non-enemy country with which Canada has a friendly 
diplomatic relationship. Nor could CSEC demonstrate that its activities were 
security-related, unless it was able to somehow prove that Brazilian energy 
companies threatened the livelihoods and liberties of Canadians. 
The only other possible legal justification for CSEC’s activities would be that 
this collection of foreign intelligence pertained to international affairs. As noted 
above, the term “international affairs” is undefined in the NDA; however, the 
phrase also appears in the Access to Information Act. In summarizing the current 
state of the law, the Office of the Information Commissioner borrowed from 
Oxford Dictionary definitions to define “international affairs” in two parts: 
international, as in “existing, involving, or carried on between two or more 
nations”; and affairs, as in “a concern; a business; a matter to be attended to…”13 
                                                                                                                                            
11  Canada (AG) v Almalki, 2010 FC 1106, 333 DLR (4th) 506 [Almalki]. 
12  Ibid at paras 77–8. 
13 Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada, “Section 15: International Affairs and Defence”, 
online: <www.oic-ci.gc.ca/eng/inv_inv-gui-ati_gui-inv-ati_section_15.aspx>. While the Commission 
noted “it is not possible to define the parameters/describe the scope of the provision,” it provided 
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If this broad definition of “international affairs” is applied to the NDA, then 
CSEC’s spying in Brazil would fall within the scope of its mandate. As a potential 
competitor to Canadian industry and interests, the activities of the Brazilian 
Ministry could be reasonably construed as a subject of international “concern” or 
a “matter to be attended to.”  
While the decision to take a liberal interpretation of “international affairs” 
has a legitimate legal basis, such a reading has serious and far-reaching 
implications. As the Globe and Mail ’s editorial board argues, under this definition 
international affairs “could cover the activities of the most innocent non-
Canadian NGO and the most humdrum, law-abiding, non-Canadian business 
that operates in more than one country.”14 The ability to gather such expansive 
foreign intelligence under the guise of “international affairs” suggests the need 
for a more refined approach. While the current NDA does not specify the 
purposes of CSEC’s powers or mandate, revisiting the legislation that first 
codified CSEC—the Anti-terrorism Act—is helpful to delineate the organization’s 
raison d’etre. The Act ’s preamble emphasizes, among other things, the need to 
combat terrorism and to maintain international peace and security.15 Refocusing 
the notion of foreign intelligence to specifically address these objectives may help 
crystalize the meaning of “international affairs.” Otherwise, the status quo 
effectively maintains CSEC’s ability to pursue economic espionage under the 
cloak of broadly worded, imprecise legislation. 
II. THE ESPIONAGE ACT  AND SECURITY OF INFORMATION ACT 
In Canada, as in the US, it is illegal for an intelligence officer to divulge secret 
information. However, this restriction is subject to whistleblower protection 
measures.16 Before turning to Snowden, it is worth examining the legal 
                                                                                                                                            
examples of information that may fall under the ambit of international affairs. The examples focused 
predominantly on inter-state diplomatic relations; however, the Commission also listed “information 
relating to sensitive matters (for example, Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic) for the country” as 
information that may fall under the category. While the examples are merely illustrative, it is possible that 
the spying program could be construed as a “sensitive matter for the country” as well.  
14  “More Intelligence”, supra note 5. 
15  Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41. 
16 Security of Information Act, RSC 1985, c O-5, ss 13–14 [SOIA]. 
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mechanisms used in both jurisdictions to prohibit disclosures of secret 
information, including disclosures such as the CSEC slideshow, which was 
classified as “Top Secret.”17 By analyzing the American legislation under which 
Snowden has actually been charged, it will be easier to assess how and whether 
he would be charged if he had disclosed the same information as a Canadian 
intelligence worker. In this respect, Snowden’s now infamous revelations offer 
analysts a useful case study to test how Canadian secrecy and whistleblower 
protection laws might operate. 
The Espionage Act in the United States 
The US Espionage Act, originally passed during the Red Scare in 1917, is most 
commonly understood as prohibiting persons sworn to secrecy from delivering 
classified information to foreign governments. This type of “classic spying” is 
well known from the cases of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Robert Hanssen, 
who were famously convicted under the Espionage Act in 1951 and 2002, 
respectively. However, the Espionage Act also criminalizes any disclosure of 
information relating to national defence, irrespective of whether the responsible 
party was a member of a foreign government. American jurisprudence defines 
the meaning of “information relating to national defence” broadly. It includes any 
information closely held by the government that, if disclosed, could harm the 
US,18 which would seem to include information concerning international affairs. 
Snowden has been charged under section 793(d) of the Espionage Act, which reads: 
(d)  Whoever, lawfully having possession of, access to, control over, 
or being entrusted with any document…relating to the national 
defense, or information relating to the national defense which 
information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to 
the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign 
nation, willfully communicates…or attempts to communicate… 
the same to any person not entitled to receive it; 
[…] 
                                                                                                                                            
17 Colin Freeze, “Read a CSEC document that was first acquired by Snowden”, The Globe and Mail (30 
November 2013), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/read-a-csec-document-on-brazil-
that-was-first-acquired-by-edward-snowden/article15699941> [Freeze, “Read a CSEC document”]. 
18  United States v Rosen, Case No 1:05cr225 (ED Va, 9 August 2006) at para 20 [Rosen]. 
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 Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten 
years, or both.19 
Just as “information relating to national defence” has been interpreted 
expansively, so too has the clause “to any person not entitled to receive it.”20 
While the US Supreme Court averred in the 1941 decision Gorin v US that 
violations under the Espionage Act require “bad faith” on the part of the person 
making a disclosure, more recent jurisprudence has taken a broad view of what 
“bad faith” entails.21 According to US v Rosen, a 2005 decision of the US District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, bad faith requires the person to have 
“reason to believe the disclosure could harm the United Sates or aid a foreign 
government.”22 Rosen follows the precedent set by the Fourth Circuit in the 1988 
case US v Morison, in which the court ruled that the government does not need to 
demonstrate the defendant intended to cause harm.23 This interpretation of section 
793(d) affords more latitude and favour to the state in prosecuting whistleblowers 
who may have acted with the goal of advancing the public interest. 
The liberal interpretation of section 793 has been applied and elaborated in 
light of the government’s shift toward using the Espionage Act for targeting ‘non-
traditional’ leakers more vigorously. Six of the nine persons accused or convicted 
under the Espionage Act for releasing information to the press, including Snowden, 
have been charged or convicted during President Barack Obama’s 
administration.24 There are three prevailing rationales that explain the US 
government’s recent focus on leaks to the media. First, the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
intensified the need to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to classified 
information. In the past, states were predominantly concerned with protecting 
their information from other foreign states. This narrower focus was significantly 
more manageable for the relevant government agencies. Second, ‘leakers’ are 
                                                                                                                                            
19  Espionage Act, 18 USC § 793(d). Snowden has also been charged under § 641 and §798(a)(3). 
20  Stephen Vladeck, “The Espionage Act and National Whistleblowing after Garcetti ” (2008) 57:5 Am U L 
Rev 1531 at 1537. 
21  David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, “The End to an Unspoken Bargain? National Security and Leaks in a 
Post-Pentagon Papers World” (2013) 48 Harv CR-CLL Rev 473 at 496.  
22  Rosen, supra note 18 at para 63. 
23  McCraw & Gikow, supra note 21 at 497. 
24  Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, “US charges Snowden with espionage”, The Washington Post (21 June 2013), 
online: Washington Post <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-
espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html>. 
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increasingly emerging from lower levels of government where they are more 
difficult to supervise. Previously, high-level decision makers would frequently 
leak information to the press when it suited the administration’s interests and 
when they were able to control the content of the disclosure.25 However, recent 
cases against Shamai Leibowitz and Jeffrey Sterling demonstrate that the 
government is no longer “the only ship that leaks from the top.”26 Related to this 
point is a third explanation for the government’s recent focus on leaks to the 
media—that is, the digitization of government documents and the relative ease 
with which massive quantities of information may now be disseminated through 
the Internet. Case in point: in 2010 Chelsea Manning, a low-level military officer, 
delivered over 250,000 diplomatic cables to WikiLeaks, a rogue online media 
entity.27 The use of novel tools for prosecution, such as section 793(d), signifies 
both the US government’s concern for unauthorized disclosures, as well as the 
utility of the Espionage Act in punishing and possibly deterring prospective leakers.  
The Security of Information Act in Canada 
Canadian secrecy law was originally set out in the 1939 Official Secrets Act 
(OSA), which was modelled on the British statute of the same name.28 As 
American commentators note, the British Official Secrets Act was far more 
prohibitive than its American equivalent; it criminalized the reproduction of 
government information by the media and created a reverse onus on the accused 
to demonstrate that the conduct was not damaging to the state. Professor David 
Pozen, who specializes in national security and information law at Columbia Law 
School, observed that “many have asserted that such a law would not be 
tolerated” in the US.29 The criticisms levelled against the British legislation were 
also directed against its Canadian counterpart. The 1969 Royal Commission on 
                                                                                                                                            
25  David Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful 
Disclosures of Information” (2013) 127 Harv L Rev 512 at 528–9, 592–5. 
26  Mary-Rose Papandrea, “The Publication of National Security Information in the Digital Age” (2011) 5:1  
J National Security L & Pol’y 119 at 121. 
27  David Leigh, “How 250,000 US embassy cables were leaked”, The Guardian (28 November 2010), online: 
Guardian News & Media <www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/28/how-us-embassy-cables-leaked>. 
28  Forcese, supra note 10 at 422.  
29  Pozen, supra note 25 at 626. 
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Security (sometimes referred to as the Mackenzie Commission) whose mandate 
was to review government security procedures concluded that the OSA was over-
inclusive. In 1979, the Ontario Superior Court went so far as to recommend a 
complete redrafting of the legislation.30 The statute had also been criticized in the 
early Charter era. For instance, the Canadian Law Reform Commission argued in 
1986 that the reverse onus test violated section 11(d) of the Charter.31 
Despite these criticisms, it was not until the Chrétien government passed 
the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) in 2001 that the calls for reform were heeded. As 
part of the ATA, the Security of Information Act (SOIA) was designed to adequately 
protect the security interests of the state while respecting due process rights of 
the accused.32 To date, the SOIA has never been used to charge a person who 
disclosed information to the press. The only person sentenced under the statute, 
Jeffrey Paul Delisle, was convicted in 2013 for divulging information to another 
state.33  
 Under section 14 of the SOIA, a person permanently bound to secrecy who 
intentionally and without authority communicates or confirms “special 
operational information” is guilty of an indictable offence. Thus, in determining 
whether Snowden would be subject to the Act, a judge would have to first 
determine whether Snowden was a person permanently bound by secrecy, and 
then consider whether the information he communicated was “special 
operational information.” 
Meanwhile, section 8(1) of the SOIA defines a person permanently bound 
to secrecy as someone who is “a current or former member or employee of a 
department, division, branch or office of the federal public administration, or any 
                                                                                                                                            
30  Forcese, supra note 10 at 422. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Despite amendments to the existing regime, some of the language of the 1939 Act remained intact. For 
instance, section 4 prohibits the communication of secret information to any person not entitled to receive 
it. The fact that the provision applies to any person in possession of government information, be it a non-
secret civil servant or a journalist, has been ruled unconstitutional for its vagueness and overbreadth, as 
well as its infringement on freedom of the press. See O’Neill v Canada (AG), [2006] OJ No 4189 (QL) at 
paras 62, 71, 272 DLR (4th) 193. 
33  Since Jeffrey Paul Delisle’s conviction, Qing Quentin Huang has been charged under the SOIA for 
providing secret information to the Chinese government. See Stewart Bell, “Ontario’s Qing Quentin 
Huang, accused of spying for China, was ‘against capitalism,’ former employer says”, National Post (3 
December 2013), online: National Post <news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/ontarios-qing-quentin-
huang-accused-of-spying-for-china-was-against-capitalism-former-employer-says>. 
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of its parts, set out in the schedule,” which lists CSEC among other national 
security-oriented government departments and agencies. Although Snowden was 
a contractor working for the NSA and was not, strictly speaking, a government 
employee, he would still fall within the scope of the Act. CSEC, unlike the NSA, 
does not employ contractors to fulfill its mandate; however, the scope of persons 
“permanently bound by secrecy” contemplates the use of contractors as well. 
Section 10(1) enables a deputy department head to bind any person to secrecy if 
the person had, has, or will have access to special operational information and it 
is in the interest of national security to designate the person.34 In light of this 
provision, it is reasonable to presume that a person in Snowden’s position, with 
similar access to secret information, would be conferred this status by the Deputy 
Minister of Defence. Thus, there is little doubt that Snowden would be a person 
permanently bound by secrecy under the SOIA. 
Snowden’s disclosures would also satisfy the second threshold in section 14, 
as the information he revealed would qualify as “special operational information.” 
The meaning of the term, as defined in the SOIA, includes a wide scope of 
information including the “means that the Government of Canada used, uses or 
intends to use, or is capable of using, to covertly collect or obtain, or to decipher, 
assess, analyze, process, handle, report, communicate or otherwise deal with 
information or intelligence.”35 For greater certainty, the legislation states that 
“information or intelligence similar in nature to information or intelligence referred 
to in the above definition that is in relation to, or received from, a foreign entity 
or terrorist group” is special operational information.36 Courts could use this 
clause, along with the definition preceding it, to take a liberal approach to 
classifying information as “special operational,” just as an expansive definition 
has been accorded to “defence information” under the US Espionage Act.  
As someone lawfully bound by secrecy who disclosed intelligence-gathering 
mechanisms and information relating to a foreign entity to the press, Snowden’s 
activities fall under the purview of section 14. Therefore, the question is how each 
                                                                                                                                            
34  “Deputy head” is defined for the purpose of subsection 10(1) in SOIA, supra note 16, s 8(2). 
35  Ibid, s 8. 
36  Ibid.  
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respective agency would consider Snowden’s disclosures, given that the leaks 
revealed activity that could have potentially compromised the public’s interest in 
government transparency, the adherence to the rule of law, and the preservation 
of Canada’s economic and diplomatic standing. It is to this question that the 
article now turns. 
III. WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND DEFENCES IN THE UNITED STATES  
AND CANADA 
American and Canadian Approaches to Whistleblower Protection 
In the US, Snowden would not be able to avail himself of any whistleblower 
protections to defend his disclosures of classified information. This is because 
American law fails to provide any legal protection for NSA government 
contractors who, like Snowden, report wrongdoing. This is the case 
notwithstanding the fact that 70% of the NSA’s budgets are spent on private 
contracts.37 Even protection for US government employees is inadequate. 
Government employees can report abuse to their Department’s Inspector 
General, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, and eventually to 
Congress, without fearing reprisal.38 However, the reporting scheme has been 
criticized as setting whistleblowers up for failure.39 Apart from the bureaucratic 
hurdles that employees would have to overcome, they may also find themselves 
in the uncomfortable position of reporting to the very people responsible for 
approving or shielding the questionable activity.40  
                                                                                                                                            
37 RM Perry, Intelligence whistleblower protections: In brief (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2014) at 2, 
7; Tim Shorrock, “Meet the Contractors Analyzing your Private Data”, Salon (10 June 2013), online: 
<www.salon.com/2013/06/10/digital_blackwater_meet_the_contractors_who_analyze_your_personal_ 
data>. 
38  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, PL 113-126, 128 Stat 1390, 1414 (2014). See also Perry, 
supra note 37 at 2–4. 
39  Pozen, supra note 25 at 527. 
40  David Axe, “Obama order protects intelligence community whistleblowers” (15 October 2012), online: 
The Center for Public Integrity <www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/15/11473/obama-order-protects-
intelligence-community-whistleblowers>. On retaliation against whistleblowers, see also Perry, supra note 
37 at 6. 
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Most troublingly, there is “absolutely zero protection” for whistleblowers 
who release information to the media, even when they reveal illegal activity.41 The 
inability to report to the media removes an important tool in the arsenal of the 
whistleblower. Government agencies may wilfully ignore threats to publicize 
information because they are secure in their knowledge that a person cannot rely 
on a whistleblower defence when publicly releasing information. The irony, of 
course, is that only an illegal act from a whistleblower could expose an illegal 
program. This demonstrates the mismatched priorities of the American 
government: an administration that refused to prosecute torturers would be eager 
to imprison the person responsible for disclosing the torture’s existence.42 
While the American approach is ostensibly designed to favour the 
maintenance of national security, a lesson from the Snowden affair may be that 
the absence of sufficient protections can encourage whistleblowers to pursue 
channels outside the law and compromise national security to a greater extent 
than would have otherwise occurred. Although public interests in disclosure and 
national security are often viewed as mutually exclusive, they should not be 
viewed as fitting neatly in watertight compartments. Providing some level of 
protection should be viewed as a means to discourage wholesale leaks that would 
have an even greater adverse effect than a smaller leak conducted in accordance 
with the law. 
Flowing from this premise, and in contrast to the American approach, the 
Canadian SOIA envisages a public interest defence that enables a national security 
employee to publicly release information without facing criminal sanction. 
Section 15 of the SOIA exempts a person sworn to secrecy from conviction if 
“the person establishes that he or she acted in the public interest.”43 Determining 
whether Snowden acted in the public interest under Canadian law is speculative 
given that section 15 has never been argued before a judge and academic 
commentary rarely speaks to its application. However, this uncertainty is precisely 
what makes Snowden’s case fascinating. It allows lawyers to explore how section 
                                                                                                                                            
41  Pozen, supra note 25 at 527. 
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15 might operate and provides a case study to determine whether the Act ’s 
provisions are overly restrictive or lenient in comparison to the equivalent 
American legislation. 
A cursory examination indicates that section 15 would not be available as a 
defence for Snowden. Before CSEC employees can disclose secret material, 
section 15(5) requires them to first bring their concerns to the attention of the 
deputy head or the Deputy Attorney General as well as the CSEC Commissioner. 
By disclosing the NSA’s activities directly to a journalist without informing the 
relevant officials beforehand, Snowden did not follow the procedure under 
section 15. The more interesting question is whether Snowden would be 
protected under the public interest defence if he had exhausted the internal 
processes under section 15(5). In other words, would Snowden be permitted to 
release the Brazilian slideshow after discovering its existence in the course of his 
employment, assuming he had already notified the appropriate authorities?  
Applying Whistleblower Protection Law to Snowden 
Section 15(2) of the SOIA requires judges to undertake a two-step test and 
consider several factors when determining whether a person in Snowden’s 
situation acted in the public interest. Section 15(3) requires a judge to first 
establish whether Snowden acted to disclose an offence that he reasonably 
believed had been or was about to be committed by another person, and then to 
balance the public interest in disclosure against the public interest in non-
disclosure. Section 15(4) enumerates the factors that a judge must consider in 
assessing whether Snowden acted in the public interest when he released the 
documents, including: 
(a) whether the extent of the disclosure is no more than is reasonably 
necessary to disclose the alleged offence or prevent the 
commission or continuation of the alleged offence, as the case 
may be; 
(b) the seriousness of the alleged offence; 
(c) whether the person resorted to other reasonably accessible 
alternatives before making the disclosure and, in doing so, 
whether the person complied with any relevant guidelines, policies 
or laws that applied to the person; 
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(d) whether the person had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
disclosure would be in the public interest; 
(e) the public interest intended to be served by the disclosure; 
(f) the extent of the harm or risk of harm created by the disclosure; 
and 
(g) the existence of exigent circumstances justifying the disclosure. 
A methodical analysis of each branch of the test demonstrates why Snowden is 
unlikely to benefit from section 15. 
The first branch of the test requires a judge to decide whether Snowden 
disclosed an offence that he reasonably believed was, was being, or was about to 
be violated. As noted in Part I, there is no law that expressly prohibits CSEC from 
conducting economic espionage. Thus, it would be difficult for Snowden to 
identify an offence under an Act of Parliament that was, was being, or was about 
to be violated by CSEC employees. This would preclude him from proceeding to 
the public interest balancing test. 
This reality reveals a major flaw in the legislation. In an area as nebulous as 
national security law, it may be difficult for whistleblowers to pinpoint specific 
offences that were committed. Indeed, determining the legality of the Olympia 
program is hardly clear-cut for an experienced member of the legal community, 
let alone for an employee untrained in the law. Unfortunately, the result is that 
this provision may deter prospective whistleblowers from coming forward with 
information of serious public concern if they believe they will be automatically 
denied an opportunity to argue that their disclosure was in the public interest. 
Moreover, national security employees spearheading programs such as Olympia 
may infer that so long as their actions have a semblance of legality, they will 
continue to be shielded from public scrutiny.  
To overcome this problem, Parliament ought to amend the first branch of 
section 15(2) in order to permit a judge to undertake a public interest balancing 
test so long as the whistleblower had reasonable grounds to believe that he or she 
was disclosing an offence committed by a CSEC employee. This would allow 
Snowden to argue that it was reasonable to believe that CSEC’s mandate did not 
permit the agency to conduct operations such as Olympia and that there was a 
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reasonable basis for believing those responsible for the operation had acted 
contrary to Canadian law.  
Irrespective of these policy concerns, Snowden would not be exculpated 
even if the court found that he disclosed an actual offence. Such a finding would 
merely permit the judge to proceed to the second branch of the public interest 
test. Under the second branch, Snowden would likely fail to demonstrate that the 
balance of indicia in section 15(4) favoured disclosure as well. 
Sections 15(4)(b), (d), and (e): The Seriousness of the Alleged Offence, 
Reasonable Belief of Public Interest, and the Intended Public Interest Served 
For starters, Snowden would be able to satisfy the considerations under 
section 15(4)(d) and (e) that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
disclosure was in the public interest, and that the intended public interest in 
disclosure was compelling. Given the vast extent of economic espionage and the 
potential public debate that such a revelation could provoke, a reasonable person 
in Snowden’s position could have believed that the public would be well-served 
by knowing about CSEC’s activities. The subsequent concerns expressed by 
government officials, media, and even Parliamentarians44 demonstrated ex facto 
that disclosure served an important public purpose by sparking debate and 
accelerating calls for reform. Furthermore, Snowden could argue that the 
Canadian public had an interest in knowing the types of operations that CSEC 
undertakes pursuant to its mandate in order to enhance government 
accountability. The disclosure could (and, as it turned out, did) spark wider 
debates concerning whether economic espionage is something that an intelligence 
community agency should engage in, given its limited resources.  
Granted, Snowden’s leak of the Brazilian slideshow is not on the same scale 
as disclosing a wide-ranging data collection program, as existed in the US. Such 
an operation would entail potential infringements of section 8 Charter rights and 
would deserve thorough public scrutiny. However, the absence of a potential 
constitutional breach should not prima facie constitute sufficient grounds to 
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invalidate the important public interest served in disclosing CSEC’s activities, nor 
should it discount the seriousness of the alleged offence when weighing the merits 
of disclosure under section 15(4)(b). In fact, since CSEC’s spying could have 
adverse impacts on Canadian economic actors and Canada’s reputation abroad, 
the stakes for the Canadian public—and the economy—are high. In addition, the 
more intangible goals of public debate and transparency should not be 
discounted. Keeping this aspect of CSEC’s mandate secret would diminish 
government accountability and would further shield the country’s foreign affairs 
from public view. Furthermore, had a potential breach under the NDA been 
made out, a compromise of CSEC’s mandate with widespread international 
implications would be an important consideration in weighing the seriousness of 
the alleged offence under 15(4)(b). In essence, Snowden “brought to light things 
that the public needed to know, and started a public debate that needed to 
happen.”45  
Sections 15(4)(a), (g), and (c): Extent of the Disclosure, its Exigency, and 
Reasonable Steps Taken to Avoid Disclosure 
Snowden’s public interest defence is most likely to fail when the judge 
considers whether the extent of the disclosure was no more than reasonably 
necessary to disclose the alleged offence, pursuant to section 15(4)(a). This 
requirement was not met. The Globe and Mail national security columnist Colin 
Freeze noted that he was not able to publish the full contents of the uncovered 
slideshow because it contained sensitive information, including names, phone 
numbers, and Internet Protocol addresses.46 This finding suggests that the 
contents of the slideshow exposed more information than was necessary in order 
to corroborate the alleged illegal activity. If the information that Snowden 
revealed went beyond the mere identification of the program’s existence, and 
therefore beyond what was reasonably necessary, it may very well tip the balance 
in favour of a public interest in non-disclosure.  
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Snowden also could not rely on a claim that exigent circumstances required 
the information to be disclosed. If Snowden uncovered ongoing violations of 
Canadians’ rights or an act with the potential to cause serious bodily harm or 
death, a certain urgency to stop the continuing activity would be warranted. 
However, the contents of the slideshow were focused on methods of spying and 
were over a year old when they were released.47 It is doubtful that a slideshow 
revealing economic intelligence-gathering methods would require urgent 
disclosure without more and, in any case, the need for urgent action would have 
likely passed by the time Snowden released the document a year later. Therefore, 
it is unlikely that Snowden could prove that its release was exigent under section 
15(4)(g). 
Finally, determining whether Snowden exhausted other reasonably 
accessible alternatives remains an open question. For instance, there is conflicting 
evidence as to whether Snowden raised his concerns with various NSA officials 
before going public.48 Given this uncertainty, it is premature to determine 
whether the consideration under 15(4)(c) would operate in Snowden’s favour.  
Section 15(4)(f): Harm or Risk of Harm Caused by the Disclosure 
The public interest served by disclosure, while significant, is unlikely to 
outweigh the harm that the disclosure caused, pursuant to section 15(4)(f). The 
government would argue that the harm was so damaging to Canada’s long-term 
interests that the public interest favours the maintenance of secrecy. At a 
minimum, the risk of harm was significant, as the release of information 
pertaining to CSEC’s operational techniques could jeopardize CSEC’s future 
activities beyond Olympia and provide potential enemies with a window into the 
organization’s operations. This type of information is generally guarded. CSIS, 
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for its part, has developed categories of information that should not be disclosed; 
these guidelines were cited in Almalki.49 Among these categories are information 
that identifies or tends to identify methods of operation or techniques, and 
information that identifies or tends to identify CSIS interests in individuals, 
groups, or issues.50 The slideshow falls squarely within this definition because it 
details a potential economic espionage operation against a specific target. Thus, 
applying the CSIS rule would suggest that the disclosure caused substantial 
damage.  
The potential to harm the public interest through this disclosure is even 
more pronounced in an international context. This type of disclosure could 
compromise Canada’s reputation abroad by creating or furthering the perception 
that Canada is irresponsible in guarding its privileged information. When the 
courts have been asked to assess the merits of disclosing evidence under the 
Canada Evidence Act, they have taken into account the anticipated damage inflicted 
upon Canada’s international relations. As noted by the Federal Court in Canada v 
Ribic, the release of sensitive information has the power to “make Canada’s allies 
more reluctant to share intelligence in the future, thereby denying Canada access 
to vital information that would be required to protect civilians…”51 However, a 
common-sense approach is required; not all information would seriously 
jeopardize Canada’s reputation or national security if it were released publicly. As 
Justice Noel noted in Canada (AG) v Canada (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions 
of Canadian Officials), the established practice of limiting disclosure for the sake of 
international relations cannot be overused to redact information that would have 
no serious impact on Canada’s allies if it were released.52  
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However, Snowden is unlikely to benefit from such an approach because 
the information he revealed was operational. As University of Ottawa professor 
Wesley Wark suggests, it is improbable that the Olympia program was “made in 
Canada.” Instead, it is more likely the result of a directive from the upper echelons 
of the so-called Five Eyes.53 Under this exclusive alliance, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the US have agreed not to spy on each other 
and to work collaboratively by sharing intelligence derived from communication 
and electronic signals. A hypothetical court decision that afforded Snowden a 
defence would also have the effect of condoning the release of classified 
information. Considering that Canada receives more intelligence from the Five 
Eyes than it produces, endorsing such a disclosure could damage Canada’s 
position within the alliance. An application of the judge’s holding in Ribic suggests 
that Snowden’s disclosure could negatively affect CSEC’s abilities to work with 
its partners for the purpose of protecting the Canadian public.  
Summary of Balancing Exercise 
The various factors under section 15(4) must now be balanced. On one 
hand, Snowden would prevail in demonstrating that there were reasonable 
grounds to believe that the disclosure was in the public interest and that the 
intended public interest grounds were important. However, the government 
would likely succeed in demonstrating that Snowden’s disclosures caused 
significant harm to Canada’s national security apparatus and revealed more 
information than was reasonably necessary to expose the alleged offence. A 
further factor weighing against Snowden is that he released the information in the 
absence of exigent circumstances.  
In light of the above observations, a court would probably find that the 
public interest in non-disclosure outweighs the public interest in disclosure. This 
is consistent with jurisprudence under the Canada Evidence Act public interest 
balancing test where courts have placed a premium on maintaining government 
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secrecy for the sake of protecting national security. The Supreme Court of Canada 
in R v Carey notes that the law has at times given virtually absolute priority to 
national security claims.54 In Ribic, the court decided that a judge must resort to 
the means that are the least prejudicial to these interests in deciding to disclose 
information.55 While the analysis under the SOIA calls for an ex-post, instead of 
ex-ante, review, the courts’ heightened concern in endorsing the release of 
sensitive information would inform a section 15 analysis as well. Accordingly, the 
harm caused by the disclosures and Snowden’s methods of releasing the 
information may be decisive in preventing him from successfully employing the 
public interest defence. 
Given this conclusion, section 15 offers inadequate protection for 
prospective whistleblowers. While a judge is required to consider all the factors 
under section 15(4), there are no guidelines indicating how these factors are to be 
weighed. On a formal reading of the legislation, sufficient leverage is built into 
the balancing test in order to more heavily weigh the public interest for disclosure 
in some cases, such as when constitutional rights are at stake, while privileging 
the harm done to national security in other cases, such as when important 
operational information is released. Still, based on the precedents established in 
Ribic, national security interests may be prioritized over other interests. Thus, the 
efficacy of section 15 could be undermined if the provision is left to the courts 
without any guidance as to its application. If the considerations under section 
15(4)(f) become more determinative than other factors, for instance, the entire 
balancing exercise may become a foregone conclusion.  
It is laudable that the Canadian whistleblower provision provides a legal 
mechanism by which illegal activities can be brought to the public’s attention. In 
that respect, the Canadian legislation better achieves the balance between 
government accountability and national security than its American counterpart. 
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More important, however, is to what extent the legislation can actualize this 
balance, rather than simply being a false-promise to whistleblowers who depend 
on its provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
“As loath as I am to give any credit to what’s happened here, I think 
it’s clear that some of the conversations this has generated, some of 
the debate, actually needed to happen… If there’s a good side to this, 
maybe that’s it.”56 
—James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence of the United States 
Since Snowden’s leaks, the American and British governments have 
reportedly sought to rein in their respective security intelligence agencies. Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper commented that he was “very concerned” about 
revelations that CSEC was spying on the Brazilian government.57 This may signal 
that some members of the Five Eyes recognize that the extent of their 
surveillance was misguided and perhaps even illegal. But as Oxford University 
Professor Timothy Garton Ash asks, “Would they be springing into action if not 
for the whistleblower and a free press?”58 
This question underlies the debate over which public interest should take 
precedence: the interest in disclosing information or the interest in maintaining 
national security. As demonstrated above, CSEC’s economic espionage in Brazil, 
as disclosed by Snowden, is most likely legal under Canadian law. While Snowden 
would be subject to the SOIA, he would not benefit from the SOIA’s public 
interest defence if he were tried in Canada. It is apparent from this analysis that 
the protections afforded to whistleblowers in the US are inadequate because 
American law does not admit any circumstance in which whistleblowers can 
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legally make illegal activities known to the public. In this respect, the Canadian 
system is far superior. Whistleblowers in Canada have a legal avenue to reveal 
secret information in the public interest; however, the public interest defence is 
not an easy threshold to meet. 
Speaking from Russia in asylum, Snowden has stated that his biggest fear in 
releasing the classified information was that “nothing would change.”59 Time has 
proven Snowden’s concern to be misplaced. Irrespective of the political and 
national security consequences of his disclosure, his case continues to compel 
legal commentators to seriously evaluate the parameters guiding security agencies 
and the protections afforded to whistleblowers. To paraphrase James Clapper, 
there is a good side to this, and that’s it. 
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